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I. INTRODUCTION 
 One need not spend much time in business settings to observe that reason does not 
always rule.  My own academic curiosity in the psychology of organizational behavior started 
while I was still in practice, first in a law firm and then in government, recently having 
studied corporate law informed by the law and economics movement of the 1970’s.  This 
was a time when even political progressives had become enamored with marketplace 
solutions to regulatory problems (the wave of deregulation in the airline industry, banking, 
etc.), and the rational actor model of competitive behavior had taken a firm grip on policy 
analysis.   
 Even though I was a junior lawyer, I was fortunate enough to find myself in a 
number of projects where I was able to observe (quietly and without any hope of 
influencing) senior executives of very important companies and very high government 
officials at work.  I also paid close attention to the senior lawyers who advised them.  My 
impression, which later turned into a particular research interest,1 was that ego often seemed 
the more compelling force in judgment and decision-making than cold, hard rationality, and 
that senior subordinates were often enablers of egotistical choices.  The lawyers and 
executives I most admired were those clever enough to prompt different, and presumably 
better, choices via flattery and other influence techniques that left the top person’s inflated 
self-esteem relatively intact.   
 Even then, of course, there was a large body of scholarly work in social psychology 
and organizational behavior that questioned the assumption of pervasive rationality in 
competitive business settings and readily accommodated pervasive egotistical inference and 
other cognitive biases.  Orthodox economics has had its doubters all along.  Over time, this 
academic joust has turned into a remarkably fruitful research agenda.2  While some 
interdisciplinary tension remains, the collaboration between psychology and economics has 
become constructive and productive under the heading of behavioral economics.  The genre 
often referred to as “new institutional economics” readily incorporates ideas such as 
bounded rationality, information deficiencies, transaction costs, agency costs, moral hazard, 
                                                 
* Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University.  My thanks to Bob Thompson, Eric 
Sundstrom, and Joan Heminway for very helpful comments and discussion. 
1 Donald C. Langevoort, Ego, Human Behavior, and Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 853, 860-65 (1995); Donald C. 
Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other 
Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 120-30 (1997) [hereinafter Langevorrt, Organized Illusions]. 
2 See The Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 59 J. BUS. S181 (1986) (An important symposium published in 
the Journal of Business in 1986 set forth the differences and common ground between the traditionalists and the 
behavioralists, the latter having been particularly influenced by the Nobel Prize-winning work of Amos Tversky 
and Daniel Kahneman); Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal 
Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998) (for a review of how the debate between 
traditionalist and behavioralists quickly diffused into legal scholarship). 
66 TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [VOL. 12 
and the like into theories of behavior that depart considerably from the Bayesean depiction 
of rational choice commonly used in formal economic models.  In turn, scholarship in 
corporate and securities law has borrowed extensively from this new learning, especially in 
the last decade or so, to try to incorporate limits on rationality into legal analysis of corporate 
behavior.   
 What has become clear for both descriptive and normative analysis is that 
incorporating insights from psychology into corporate and securities law means having to 
climb four tall steps to gain plausibility.  The first tall step to overcome stems from the fact 
that what psychologists describe as predictable cognitive traits or biases are not observed 
consistently even in the decision-making of a single individual.  Most people are capable of 
acting more or less rationally, depending on a host of situational, emotional, and other 
contingent influences.  As a result, we have to know much about the situation as well as the 
person to make any robust behavioral prediction.3  The psychologically prudent answer to 
any question of how someone, for example a CEO in a particular setting or a board of 
directors involved in group deliberation, will think or act is almost always “it depends,” 
which does not lend itself to particularly bold or confident legal analysis.   
 The strength and intensity of dispositional traits and biases observed in both 
laboratory and field settings vary considerably among the population.  Therefore, the second 
tall step to overcome is that some people are more likely to display these predicable 
cognitive traits or biases than others.  In other words, even if we know the situational 
context, we also have to know something about the personality and related dispositional 
makeup of the particular actor.4  One of the conventional economists’ major gauntlets for 
behavioralists to negotiate is the idea that people who become CEOs, CFOs, and board 
members are different from the average person, and, by hypothesis, substantially more 
“rational.”  If rationality leads to competitive success, then rationality will be favored in the 
selection and promotion tournaments that determine who exercises corporate power.  To 
me, this is the most interesting step in the challenge to behavioral law and economics, about 
which I and others have written much.5   
 The third tall step is institutional, meaning that even if we decide that some 
behavioral trait, such as overconfidence or emotionally-driven risk-taking, is likely to affect 
executive judgment and decision-making, there is no reason to automatically assume that it 
will affect the firm’s choices.  Almost all important corporate decisions follow a process—
multiple people involved sequentially, and often with group collaboration at various steps 
along the way.  We have to predict that the process will permit the bias to survive, as against 
                                                 
3 Indeed, one of the fundamental messages of contemporary social psychology is that the situation often matters 
more than the disposition, notwithstanding the so-called fundamental attribution bias that leads people to think 
otherwise.  See, e.g., RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF 
SOCIAL JUDGMENT (Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1980). One of the important contributions to corporate behavioral 
economics casts doubt on whether something as robust as the endowment effect has significant power when 
decisions are made by corporate agents.  See Jennifer Arlen et al., Endowment Effects Within Corporate Agency 
Relationships, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2002).  
4 See Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and 
Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67 (2002). 
5 See, e.g., Langevoort, Organized Illusions, supra note 1; see also Donald C. Langevoort, Diversity and Discrimination from 
a Corporate Perspective: Grease, Grit and the Personality Types of Tournament Survivors, in 3 NYU SELECTED ESSAYS ON 
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW: BEHAVIORAL ANALYSES OF WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION 141 (Mitu Gulati & 
Michael Yelnosky eds., 2007). 
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(presumably) strong competitive incentives to “de-bias” individual shortcomings.  
Organizational behavior research has identified common de-biasing mechanisms frequently 
used by corporations.6   
 This third step can only be addressed empirically because psychology itself stops 
being concretely helpful once we pass beyond small group behavior.  Organizational scholars 
trained in sociology push back strongly against excessive focus on individual cognition, 
claiming that broad social and cultural forces, not psychological ones, are the proper subjects 
of inquiry for thinking about the firm.7  Unfortunately, sociology tends not to generate 
simple, tractable behavioral models except when reduced backwards to something like an 
economic (rational choice) approach, so that rigorously testing hypotheses is difficult.  
Moreover, the empirical questions—identifying whether outcomes are rational or non-
rational, and then trying to isolate causal connections with respect to a particular corporate 
decision—can be extraordinarily complicated.  Many instances of “poor” firm-level choice 
can plausibly be characterized as either behaviorally problematic or the result of simple, 
rational opportunism by corporate insiders, i.e., an agency cost problem.   
 These are three high steps to climb, but, as we shall see, they are surmountable if 
taken carefully.  But even if we make it that far, we reach the normative question: so what?  
If some form of non-rational behavior is commonplace, there is a prima facie case for 
intervention.  Deciding what that intervention should be, however, can itself be vexing.  The 
challenge is both ideological and practical.  Research suggests that, especially among those 
with a conservative ideological orientation, behavioral explanations do not qualify as 
legitimate excuses, and the right remedy for cognitive bias is to make the person (or firm) 
learn painfully from the experience.8  And even for those willing to engage in some kind of 
paternalistic intervention, such interventions are very costly and hard to accomplish 
successfully.  Perhaps the most common illustration, which I and others have explored at 
length,9 is that corporate and securities law’s favorite strategy—more disclosure—often fails 
when up against a well-ingrained, institutionally favored behavioral bias.  There may be 
places where a legal or regulatory “nudge” can work, but there are many others where a 
much stronger shove is necessary, because judges and regulators will feel both ill-trained and 
under-resourced to give and follow through on such a “nudge,” with respect to the expected 
and unanticipated consequences.  In other words, there are probably places where corporate 
law recognizes the likelihood of persistent behavioral biases that threaten shareholders’ best 
interests, but is without a precise, legitimate, cost-efficient response and so just ignores it.  
That is not necessarily wrong, even if it may seem lamentable. 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., Chip Heath et al., Cognitive Repairs: How Organizational Practices Can Compensate for Individual Shortcomings, in 
20 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 1-37 (Barry M. Staw & L.L. Cummings eds., 1998). 
7 See Barry M. Staw & Robert I. Sutton, Macro Organizational Psychology, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN 
ORGANIZATIONS 350-84 (Keith Murnighan ed., 1993) (useful response from researchers sympathetic to the use 
of psychology). 
8 See Philip E. Tetlock, Cognitive Biases and Organizational Correctives: Do Both Disease and Cure Depend on the Politics of 
the Beholder?, 45 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 293 (2000). 
9 This is especially so when a seller has an interest in taking advantage of the bias.  E.g., Jon D. Hanson & 
Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1999).  
In addition, there is a strong cultural and historical tolerance for advertising and marketing techniques that are at 
heart mildly manipulative, making it difficult to excise from business practice.  Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, 
Retail Investors and the Institutionalization of the Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1043-48 (2009); Sendhil 
Mullainathan et al., Coarse Thinking and Persuasion, 123 Q.J. ECON. 577 (2008).   
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II. BEHAVIORAL INSIGHTS ABOUT MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
 Legal scholars have used psychology to analyze many different problems—board of 
director group behavior in corporate law10 and marketplace “irrationality” in securities law11 
are particularly well-plowed fields.  However, with the notable exception of work by Jim 
Fanto roughly a decade ago,12 little attention has been given to integrating behavioral 
findings into mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”) law, even though some classic insights came 
from that subject area early on.  Most of the remainder of this essay will illustrate the 
methodological challenges and opportunities described in Part I as it applies to corporate 
M&A law.  We are aided here by a number of recent and thorough literature reviews by 
financial economists on behavioral approaches to corporate financial activity.13  In law, there 
is a small but helpful body of scholarship on the related subject of “behavioral antitrust” 
from which to borrow as well.14 
 The starting point here is a stark divide that exists in behavioral corporate finance.15  
Classical orthodox law and economics on merger activity assumes the rationality of both the 
managers and directors of the subject companies and their shareholders.  Even if the belief 
about shareholder rationality is relaxed somewhat, the assumption remains that the stock 
price will be set rationally in an efficient market and that the stock price will be the main 
reference point for shareholder best interests.  As a result, the possibility of irrational 
individual shareholder behavior is unlikely to be of much consequence. 
 If, however, we relax the assumption of market price efficiency, things change 
dramatically.  Since the high point of market efficiency theory in the mid to late 1970’s, 
contrarians have pointed out a number of anomalies in real world market price behavior vis-
à-vis the predicted world of near-perfect efficiency.16  Among other things, there is too much 
trading behavior, too much volatility, and too many instances of pricing excess (bubbles and 
crashes) to conform easily to the efficiency hypothesis.  To be sure, many classical financial 
economists still believe strongly in efficiency and work hard to justify the observations as 
consistent with risk-adjusted models of efficient pricing, but today the assumption is, at the 
very least, heavily contested within mainstream finance, if not on the decline.   
                                                 
10 E.g., James D. Cox & Harvey L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of 
Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (1984); Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Disney, Good 
Faith, and Structural Bias, 32 J. CORP. L. 833 (2007). 
11  See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities 
Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135 (2002); Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the 
New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635 (2003). 
12  See James A. Fanto, Quasi-Rationality in Action: A Study of Psychological Factors in Merger Decision-Making, 62 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1333 (2001); James A. Fanto, Braking the Merger Momentum: Reforming Corporate Law Governing Mega-Mergers, 
49 BUFF. L. REV. 249 (2001).   
13 See, e.g., Malcolm Baker et al., Behavioral Corporate Finance: A Survey, in THE HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE 
FINANCE EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE (B. Espen Eckbo ed., 2007) [hereinafter Baker et al., Behavioral 
Corporate Finance]. 
14 See, e.g., Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Economists at the Gate: Antitrust in the Twenty-first Century, 38 LOYOLA U. CHI. 
L.J. 513 (2007); Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline and Legal Policy, 101 MICH. 
L. REV. 482 (2002). 
15  See Baker et al., supra note 13.   
16  See Langevoort, supra note 11; Stout, supra note 11.  
2011]  THE BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 69 
 We need not explore in detail what behavioral finance substitutes for market 
efficiency.  There is certainly no agreed upon model of non-rational stock price movements 
(if there were, it would promptly be arbitraged away).  Instead, there are often conflicting 
predictions of overreaction and under-reaction to news, momentum trading, trading on 
pseudo-news, and the like, many of which can be tied to well-known behavioral regularities 
like loss aversion, ambiguity aversion, the representativeness heuristic, limited attention, etc.  
We can fairly assume that these traits are prompted by large numbers of situational factors 
whose interaction can be extraordinarily complex and contingent, making the “irrational” 
market seem fairly chaotic and subject to unpredictable mood swings.  Numerous book-
length treatments of this field are available.17 
 For purposes of legal analysis, we need only assume that stock market prices can 
diverge from fundamental value for sustained time periods (either for individual securities, 
industries, or asset classes generally) and/or that market prices do not immediately impound 
all available public information.  We then lose confidence in market price as a discipline, 
which was the primary assumption that motivated the bold predictions of corporate law and 
economics in the 70’s and 80’s in articulating optimal (often largely deregulatory) M&A legal 
policy— e.g. the celebrated work of Easterbrook, Fischel, and others.   
 This brings us to the main fork in the road.  Irrational markets are plausible because 
they involve the participation of large numbers of smaller unsophisticated investors (“noise 
traders”) who, under the right conditions—particularly limited arbitrage because of short 
selling restrictions and limitations—can have sustained effects on stock prices.  The smart 
money in the form of larger, sophisticated investors is generally, though not inevitably, 
presumed to be more rational but unwilling or unable to stem the tide of marketplace 
emotions.  If we then assume rationality on the part of corporate managers, there are 
opportunities to exploit.  Most obviously, there will be prices of individual companies that 
are depressed temporarily vis-à-vis their fundamental value, which makes them vulnerable to 
cherry-picking in the M&A market for less than a “fair” price.18  Conversely, if it is the 
potential acquirer whose shares are overpriced because of irrational exuberance, it is time to 
do a stock-for-stock deal.19  If structural or governance deficiencies exist on the target side 
that lead too readily to a sale, we may have an unnecessary and inappropriate transfer of 
wealth to acquiring firms, unfortunately with collateral consequences to employees, 
suppliers, etc. when the transactions are highly leveraged and thus carry excessive risk.   
 We see the source here of many of the debates about takeover policy.  The less 
confidence we have in market prices, the less we can trust individual shareholders to make 
rational decisions about whether or not to tender into a hostile bid.  Collective action 
problems abound, and so most market critics tend toward accepting the need for a 
shareholders’ “bargaining agent” to make a sophisticated financial analysis of the bidder’s 
offer and act on their behalf.  The poison pill is the mechanism of choice here, which moves 
                                                 
17 E.g., GEORGE AKERLOF & ROBERT SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE 
ECONOMY AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM (2010); HERSH SHEFRIN, BEYOND GREED AND 
FEAR: UNDERSTANDING BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INVESTING (2003); ANDREI SHLEIFER, 
INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (Oxford University Press 2004) (2000).  
See also JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET (2009) (for an accessible recount of the intellectual 
history of the efficiency-inefficiency debate). 
18 See Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of “Discounted” Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 
88 COLUM. L. REV. 891 (1988). 
19  See Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Stock Market Driven Acquisitions, 70 J. FIN. ECON. 295 (2003). 
70 TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [VOL. 12 
us quickly to the question of whether a committee of independent directors of the target is 
likely to be a faithful bargaining agent.  Scholars and practitioners disagree about that issue.20  
An alternative might be to force greater disclosure from the bidder and/or target upon the 
commencement of a contested transaction and let the shareholders vote—a strategy that 
relies on a number of difficult assumptions about both the efficacy of disclosure and the 
rationality of shareholder voting decisions. 
 Again, this legal literature is so well developed that we need not dig any deeper into 
it.  It is enough for now to see the connection between the behavioral finance literature and 
the unraveling of the law and economics orthodoxy when stock prices become less reliable.  
But a second branch of behavioral corporate finance relaxes the assumption of managerial 
rationality instead of (or in addition to) assuming market inefficiency, positing that managers 
make predictable cognitive errors either in bidding for another company or in responding to 
a bid, in both negotiated and hostile transactions. 
 This is a particularly interesting subject for our purposes because it brings into play 
all four of the steps that behavioral law and economics must take to claim the desirability of 
some kind of law reform.  M&A transactions are extraordinary financial events and so 
receive deep and sustained attention, not the kind of setting for “quick and dirty” heuristics.  
They are negotiated by the most seasoned business professionals—senior executives, aided 
by teams of lawyers and bankers—not your ordinary psychology laboratory subjects.  
Further, they are subject to an extensive multi-person process of deliberation and approval 
on both sides.   
 To be sure, there are conflicts of interest and incentive deficiencies that may distort 
decisions.  Putting aside the “merger of equals” transaction, companies either acquire or are 
acquired, which means a premium will be paid to the target company shareholders (and 
perhaps pay-offs to their insiders as well).  It has been well known for some time that there 
are incentives that favor acquisitions quite apart from strategy or profitability.  So-called 
corporate imperialism is an agency cost problem arising from the fact that executive 
compensation and perquisites are more closely tied to size than efficiency.  Hence managers 
may prefer non- value-enhancing growth.  And so, the empirical evidence that many 
acquisitions are “value-destroying” in hindsight comes as no surprise.21  But that is not 
irrationality, and requires no keen psychological insight to anticipate. 
 There is, however, a growing body of work suggesting that the agency cost 
explanation may not be entirely accurate, offering a behavioral account of bidder 
overpayment instead.  I will not try to summarize all the research on this subject, but rather 
offer an overview.  One of the initial contributions here was by a distinguished (and 
otherwise fairly orthodox) financial economist, Richard Roll, who put forth his “hubris 
                                                 
20 E.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover 
Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871 (2002). 
21 E.g., Gregor Andrade et al., New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 103 (2001); Thomas Lys 
& Linda Vincent, An Analysis of Value Destruction in AT&T’s Acquisition of NCR, 39 J. FIN. ECON. 353 (1995); Sara 
Moeller et al., Wealth Destruction on a Massive Scale? A Study of Acquiring Firms Returns in the Recent Merger Wave, 60 J. 
FIN. 757 (2005).  The precise extent of the harm from acquisitions is open to question.  See William Bratton, 
Whither Hostility?, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND REGULATORY IMPACT ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 103 
(Greg Gregoriu & Luc Renneboog eds., 2007). 
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hypothesis”22 that there is something akin to a winner’s curse that arises out of any auction-
like setting because the winner will, by definition, have the most optimistic valuation of the 
asset in question and thus presumably be an outlier.  His use of hubris, a form of poor 
judgment, prompted others to look more closely at the psychological make-up of the person 
who controls the bidding: the acquirer’s CEO. 
 I noted earlier that there is no reason to believe that CEOs are psychologically 
similar to the general population; the standard assumption has been that they are more 
cognitively adept and rational.  But there is significant literature in behavioral economics—
both theoretical and empirical—that challenges that assumption and says that CEOs, on 
average, are likely to be both overly confident in their abilities and more risk-seeking than a 
rational choice model would predict.  In their overview of behavioral corporate finance, 
Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler offer the basic intuition: 
There are good reasons to focus on these particular biases in a managerial 
setting.  First, they are strong and robust, having been documented in many 
samples, in particular samples of managers.  Second they are often fairly 
easy to integrate into existing models, in that optimism can be modeled as 
an overestimate of a mean and overconfidence as an underestimate of 
variance.  Third, overconfidence leads naturally to more risk-taking.  Even 
if there is no overconfidence on average in the population of potential 
managers, those that are overconfident are more likely to perform 
extremely well (and extremely badly), placing them disproportionately in the 
ranks of upper (and former) management.  And fourth, even if managers 
start out without bias, an attribution bias—the tendency to take greater 
responsibility for success than failure—may lead successful managers to 
become overconfident. . . .23 
This all follows fairly predictably from the tournament theory of organizational selection and 
promotion: as skill levels become more concentrated up the ladder, the winner of a contest 
among managers is the one willing to risk the most and lucky enough not to have it blow up 
on him or her.24  Overconfidence leads to diminished risk perception. 
In a series of articles, Malmendier and Tate take this idea and test it empirically 
against patterns of corporate M&A behavior, using a sample of Forbes 500 firms from 1980 
                                                 
22 Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. BUS. 197 (1986); see also Bernard Black, Bidder 
Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597 (1989) (theorizing that stockholders realize gains in takeovers 
because bidders overpay, which is expected by the stockholders and incorporated into the price). 
23  See Baker et al., Behavioral Corporate Finance, supra note 13 at 37. 
24 See Anand Goel & Anjan Thakor, Overconfidence, CEO Selection, and Corporate Governance, 63 J. FIN. 2737 (2008); 
Donald C. Langevoort, The Organizational Psychology of Hyper-competition: Corporate Irresponsibility and the Lessons of 
Enron, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 968 (2002); see also Colin Camerer & Dan Lovallo, Overconfidence and Excess Entry: 
An Experimental Approach, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 306 (1999) (for an example of the extensive experimental 
literature); Mathew Hayward & Donald Hambrick, Explaining the Premiums Paid for Large Acquisitions: Evidence of 
CEO Hubris, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 103 (1997) (for many large-scale empirical studies).  This literature is closely 
related to work suggesting that CEO narcissism has an effect on acquisition behavior.  See Arijit Chatterjee & 
Donald Hambrick, It’s All About Me: Narcissistic CEO’s and their Effects on Company Strategy and Performance, 52 
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 351 (2007); see also Nihat Aktas et al., CEO Narcissism and the Takeover Process: From Private 
Initiation to Deal Completion (Nov. 19, 2010) (unpublished paper available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1638972). 
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to 1994 to support the overconfidence hypothesis.25  Choosing an objective metric for 
overconfidence is challenging, of course; Malmendier and Tate use stock option non-
exercise as a way of identifying those managers with inflated perceptions of how their firms 
will perform under their direction, a methodology that has now become fairly standard.26  
Recently, a Duke University study by Graham, Harvey, and Puri sought to dig more deeply 
and was able to administer standard psychology tests to a large sample of CEOs and CFOs 
then run regressions to identify correlations between personality types and basic corporate 
financial decisions, including M&A.  The results confirmed the basic intuition that CEOs, at 
least, are substantially more optimistic and risk tolerant than the general population.  The 
researchers found a significant relationship, but made no claim about the direction of 
causality, between these traits and the frequency of M&A activity, which they found 
consistent with the hypotheses in both Roll and Malmendier and Tate.27   
 Although the overconfidence-based theory is the dominant approach in behavioral 
corporate finance, there are other provocative findings about M&A behavior.  For example, 
a recent paper by Baker, Pan, and Wurgler considers the influence of the target’s historic 52 
week high (economically irrelevant old news) on both bidder offers and target responses.28  
With respect to target psychology, their hypothesis is: 
The most obvious application involves the disposition effect, or the 
reluctance to realize losses relative to the reference point.  While for some 
investors the reference point is likely to be their purchase price, another 
important reference point—and, importantly, one that is common across 
shareholders—is the firm’s 52 week high price. . . . This logic predicts that 
targets are more likely to approve mergers in which the offer price 
approaches or exceeds the 52 week high.  The S-shaped value function, on 
the other hand, predicts that the further is the current price from the 52 
week high, the less influence the marginal dollar has in terms of the 
                                                 
25 Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence and the Market’s Reaction, 89 J. 
FIN. ECON. 20, 21 (2008) (finding correlation between overconfidence and value destroying acquisitions, 
especially where firm has substantial internal resources).  See also Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, CEO 
Overconfidence and Corporate Investment, 60 J. FIN. 2661 (2005) (linking corporate manager confidence with 
investment decisions).  
26 See Chip Heath et al., Psychological Factors and Stock Option Exercise, 114 Q.J. ECON. 601 (1999) (for earlier work 
setting the stage for this preference). 
27 John Graham et al., Managerial Attitudes and Corporate Actions 25-26 (July 2009) (unpublished paper available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.htm?_id=1432641).  An obvious question to consider is how this benefits 
the firm such that firms are willing to hire overconfident CEOs.  There are many answers in the literature.  The 
dominant one is that an excess of optimism at the top has positive collateral effects that outweigh the occasional 
damage, such as encouraging cooperation and enthusiasm in the culture of the firm, or of promoting innovation.  
See David Hirshleifer et al., Are Overconfident CEOs Better Innovators? (April 2010) (unpublished paper 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.htm?_id=1598021); see also Eric Van Den Steen, Organizational 
Beliefs and Managerial Vision, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 256 (2005). 
28 Malcolm Baker et al., The Psychology of Pricing in Mergers and Acquisitions 7-8 (May 23, 2009) (unpublished 
paper available at http://archive.nyu.edu/handle/2451/28091).  Other work in behavioral finance also considers 
the disproportionate effect of the 52-week high.  See Thomas George & Chuan-Yang Hwang, The 52 Week High 
and Momentum Investing, 59 J. FIN. 2145 (2004). 
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perception of losses. . . . Anchoring and adjustment may also reinforce 
these predictions at the strategical level of negotiations over price.29 
With respect to bidders: 
The bidder’s psychology can be affected by anchoring and adjustment both 
directly and strategically. . . . The bidder may reason, if the target was valued 
at that level a few months ago, shouldn’t we, with our ability to realize 
synergies, value it above or at least near that same level?  To the extent that 
logic is employed, the 52 week high becomes an anchor, and insufficient 
adjustment from that level becomes the norm. . . . A bit more subtly, it 
suggests that since the bidder’s investors do not think as hard as its board 
about the target’s potential valuation, they are less biased by the anchoring 
phenomenon and so more likely to view 52 week high driven bids as 
overpaying.  Once a valuation is established, the bidder must consider the 
minimum price that the target will accept.  Bidder boards advised by 
experienced investment bankers are likely to predict that the target’s 52 
week high will both be used as a strategic anchor against them in 
negotiations as well as a reference point that their own investors truly care 
about.30 
After considering a number of possible non-psychological alternative hypotheses, they 
present data showing that the 52 week high exerts a strongly disproportionate effect on deal 
outcomes, which they attribute largely to the target’s psychology and the bidder’s 
anticipation thereof.   
 I could go on at length, as there is much more behavioral corporate finance 
literature that speaks to M&A activity either directly or indirectly.  Going back to the hubris 
hypothesis and the winner’s curse, for example, one can also find emotion-based 
explanations for the competitive urge that may produce excessive valuations on the part of 
acquirers, and perhaps reactive devaluation by targets.31  Commitment, confirmation, and 
sunk cost biases are also likely to come into play.32  Group-level biases (risky shift,33 
“groupthink”) may come into play as well.  The explosion of psychological research on 
negotiation behavior in the past few decades touches on issues of importance in M&A deal 
making in many ways.   
                                                 
29 Malcolm Baker et al., The Psychology of Pricing in Mergers and Acquisitions 7-8 (May 23, 2009) (unpublished 
paper available at http://archive.nyu.edu/handle/2451/28091).   
30 Id. at 8-9. 
31 E.g., Deepak Malhotra, The Desire to Win: The Effects of Competitive Arousal on Motivation and Behavior, 111 ORG. 
BEHAV. & HUMAN DEC. PROCESSES 139 (2010); Deepak Malhotra et al., When Winning is Everything, HARV. BUS. 
REV., May 2008, at 78.  There may be hormonal influences here, observable in merger-related activity.  See 
Maurice Levi et al., Deal or No Deal? Hormones and the M&A Game, 56 MGMT. SCI. 1462, 1463 (2010) (finding that 
younger CEOs are more dominance-seeking in M&A activity than older ones, and attributing this to the 
influence of testosterone levels). 
32 See Vicki Bogan & David Just, What Drives Merger Decision Making Behavior? Don’t Seek, Don’t Find, and Don’t 
Change Your Mind, 72 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 930 (2009). 
33 As the contemporary literature points out, groups can be both more risk seeking and more risk averse, 
depending on context.  See, e.g., Kfir Eliaz et al., Choice Shifts in Groups: A Decision-Theoretic Basis, 96 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1321 (2006).  
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 In addition, there is laboratory evidence to support the idea that cultural conflicts 
may disable mergers even when they make sense on paper.  Businesses fail to anticipate the 
learned linguistic and perceptual commonalities that help coordinate productive behavior in 
the constituent firms, and the firms clash and fail upon consolidation.34  Here again, 
overconfidence and other egocentric biases may result in firms underestimating the difficulty 
in finding synergies and eliminating redundancies when two distinct entities merge. 
 But we need not go any more deeply into these ideas because we have enough for at 
least a prima facie case that behavioral economics and behavioral finance have something 
potentially interesting to say to M&A law.  In other words, I think that the research in this 
area meets the burden of proof on the first three steps of the analysis set forth in Part I.  
This work takes seriously the need to focus specifically on behavioral traits as they are 
revealed in high level corporate executives, not just the general population.  It addresses the 
problem of how such traits might persist, and perhaps flourish, in corporate settings by 
generating competitive gains that, on average, offset the harms predictably associated with 
rationally risky behavior.  Further, it is sensitive to the institutional context, conceding that 
we need evidence of problematic outcomes in the marketplace before the causal possibility 
of heuristics and bias should seriously be considered.   
Of course—and this is a point at which lawyers and social scientists often have 
difficulty with each other—methodological rigor in research in the social sciences cautions 
against too readily drawing generalizations from data, even when the results are statistically 
significant, because there are always alternative causal explanations, risks associated with 
highly controlled experimental design, and the need for future research.  Law-making, on the 
other hand, cannot wait for scientific certainty, and must try to draw the best available 
behavioral inferences from whatever knowledge is at hand, even when it is incomplete.  My 
simple point, then, is that the work on behavioral corporate finance, when coupled with 
evidence of poor outcomes for shareholders in many M&A transactions, provides enough 
cause for the legal profession to worry about the psychological risks we have been 
describing, and to at least consider whether there are interventions that might help. 
III. THE LAW’S RESPONSE TO THE BUY-SIDE PROBLEMS 
 We know that many mergers are value destroying, with cyclical variations in average 
frequency.35 The research described above offers some insight as to why these may occur.  
So how should the law respond? 
 We should pause here for a predictable interjection from conventional financial 
economics.  As noted, there is also a plausible non-psychological explanation for value-
destroying mergers (an agency cost story about empire-building); thus resorting to a 
behavioral account is unnecessarily complicated, because outcomes are all that really matter.  
For the purposes of legal analysis, however, this is simply wrong.  Among other things, 
corporate law tends to work with state-of-mind categories like good faith, gross negligence, 
scienter, etc. that are necessarily cognitive in nature.  For example, intent or good faith 
standards might be of use in deterring M&A transactions that are deliberately empire-
                                                 
34 See Roberto Weber & Colin Camerer, Cultural Conflict and Merger Failure: An Experimental Approach, 49 MGMT. 
SCI. 400 (2003).   
35 See Moeller et al., supra note 21, at 757-58 & 757 figure 1. 
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building (the economists’ assumption),36 but not those generated by overconfidence or 
similar biases that operate out of consciousness.  We must know something about the 
underlying behavior in order to know what categories to use, unless we are prepared to rely 
on strict liability—a strongly disfavored legal standard given the close judgments and 
nuances typically involved in business judgments.   
 Thus we come back to the fourth step described in Part I: the normative choice.  
There are a number of possible interventions on the bidder’s side of the transaction that 
could respond to concerns about hubris, overconfidence, and the winner’s curse, the most 
obvious being greater shareholder say over acquisition transactions, greater independent 
director control, more intense disclosure obligations, or more probative judicial review.  
Those familiar with corporate law know that none of these provide much of a check on 
value-destruction.  Shareholder voting on the acquirer side often is not legally required,37 and 
with no approval requirement, both federal and state law disclosure obligations diminish as 
well.  Board approval is required, but without any special role for independent directors (in 
contrast to conflict of interest transactions, discussed infra).  Further, the business judgment 
rule puts in place a weak rational basis test for judicial review that can almost always be 
satisfied so long as procedural regularities are followed.38  
 Perhaps, then, corporate law is being psychologically naïve in not trying to do more, 
although my sense is that disinterest is to blame.  After all, there are a number of Delaware 
corporate law cases in which judges at both the chancery court and supreme court levels 
have made astute-enough psychological observations to show that they are aware of 
structural biases and egotistical inferences that can affect high-stakes transactional 
judgments.39  
 Rather, there are other reasons for what is probably deliberate disregard.  One, of 
course, is that we must have some confidence in the efficacy and cost-effectiveness of the 
suggested intervention, but these may be questionable for other psychological and economic 
reasons.  For instance, the law could insist on greater independent director control over 
acquisitions based on the assumption that they are less likely to exhibit overconfidence.  
However, psychology research offers many reasons to be skeptical of director independence 
as a cure for bias, most relating to the mix of reciprocity demands, low-powered incentives 
and informational deficiencies that can produce excessive deference to managerial 
preference.40  Greater shareholder approval rights may make sense, but are very costly and 
introduce uncertainty into the deal-making process.  Additionally, a strong theory of rational 
and constructive shareholder voting behavior is necessary to predict that the benefits will 
                                                 
36 See Christopher M. Bruner, Good Faith, State of Mind, and the Outer Boundaries of Director Liability in Corporate Law, 
41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1131, 1133-34 (2006). 
37 Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal’s Role in Corporate Law, 84 GEO. L. J. 1, 7 
(1995). 
38 Bruner, supra note 36, at 1133-34. 
39 E.g., In re Oracle Corp., 824 A.2d 917, 938 (Del. Ch. 2003) (discussing many motivations in judging others: 
“Delaware law should not be based on a reductionist view of human nature that simplifies human motivations on 
the lines of the least sophisticated notions of the law and economics movement.”); Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 
771 A.2d 293, 297 (Del. Ch. 2000) (questioning possibly unconscious motivations of directors); see also infra note 
47.  
40 E.g., Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of 
Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 816 (2001); but see infra note 44.  
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outweigh the costs.  Given the rise of institutional investors that, when given the 
opportunity, show some willingness to counter unwise expansion plans by acquirer 
management,41 the possibility of rational and constructive shareholder voting behavior is not 
out of the question.  But neither is it self-evident, and for the most part, voting rights are a 
legislative rather than judicial issue.  
 Similarly, deference to the business judgment rule has many familiar justifications, 
even if we accept that psychological biases may exacerbate the problem of value-destroying 
transactions.  The business judgment rule is a rule of abstention that stems from, among 
other things, judges’ lack of confidence in their own second-guessing skills—perhaps even a 
sense of their own hindsight bias.  The rule further stems from the fact that judicial review is 
labor and resource-intensive if offered by the courts.42  As discussed in Part I, there is likely 
some ideological “just deserts” reasoning occurring as well, because shareholders who elect 
overconfident managers have themselves to blame in some abstract sense, and to the extent 
that executive overconfidence is, on average, a productive bias, shareholders should 
internalize the costs of competitive zeal along with the benefits.43  
 In sum, there are significant limits on a judge’s ability and willingness to incorporate 
behavioral insights into M&A law, at least on the acquirer’s side.  However, by no means 
does that render this exercise trivial, because corporate law is about more than strategies of 
judicial or regulatory intervention.  The practice of corporate law and corporate governance—
in which lawyers are centrally involved— requires a great deal of psychological as well as 
economic astuteness, and the rich body of behavioral M&A research can and should inform 
how deals are negotiated, structured, and approved, even in the setting of minimal judicial 
review.  As Malmendier and Tate say, well-motivated, independent directors need “to play a 
more active role in project assessment and selection to counterbalance CEO 
overconfidence”44 whether or not the law compels them to.  Behavioral research offers a 
useful assessment of psychological risk from which to structure more intelligent questioning 
of managers when they aggressively promote a deal.  It is not simply a matter of figuring out 
whether the managers sincerely believe the deal is in the company’s best interest, a test which 
I suspect many naïve directors too readily employ and to which the company’s lawyers too 
willingly acquiesce. 
IV. TURNING TO THE SELL-SIDE: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
 The overconfidence and winner’s choice literature focuses on value-destroying 
acquisitions brought on by acquiring company hubris, from which target company 
shareholders, if not the target company as an entity, presumably benefit.45  However, at least 
some of the insights can be transferred to the sell-side with respect to negotiated 
acquisitions.  For example, managerial overconfidence among potential target companies 
                                                 
41 See, e.g., Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1730 
(2008). 
42 Bruner, supra note 36 at 1134. 
43 Tetlock, supra note 8. 
44 Malmendier & Tate, supra note 25, at 42.  See also Adam C. Kolasinski & Xu Li, Do Independent Directors 
Restrain Overconfident CEOs? 1, 33 (Sept. 2010) (unpulished paper available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1573395) (for evidence that a well structured board does in fact counter executive-
level overconfidence). 
45 Roll, supra note 22, at 197. 
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potentially frustrates deals that arguably should be made, and, as Baker, Pan, and Wurgler 
show in their research, other effects such as disposition, anchoring, and adjustment can 
influence seller behavior.46  Negotiated deals that do not happen are, for the most part, 
insulated from judicial review, however, bringing us back to many of the same normative 
“fourth step” issues considered above.   
 But judicial review does intensify on the sell-side in a particular set of M&A 
transactions: defensive responses to hostile takeover bids under Delaware’s Unocal and Revlon 
standards,47 and the entire fairness inquiry under Weinberger and its progeny for conflict of 
interest transactions.48  While this body of law is much too complicated to dig into deeply 
here,49 a few brief observations are necessary.   
 In these M&A transactions, independent director control and/or shareholder 
approval are much more significant.  As noted above, there may be good psychological 
justification for this approval, but that is rarely mentioned explicitly in case law or academic 
literature.  The standard explanation for enhanced scrutiny in the takeover context is the fear 
of disloyalty by target management, and perhaps by target directors, in trying to hold on to 
jobs and other private benefits of control.  In going private transactions, the controlling 
person’s financial interest in freezing out the minority shareholders at a low price is clear, 
and the assumption is that the interest is strong enough to overwhelm any inclination of 
independent directors to do right by the minority.   
 With respect to judicial review, the insight that psychology can offer relates to the 
subtle, largely unconscious process by which people rationalize a preferred course of action 
as the right thing to do.50  Conflicts of interest have a strong effect on corporate decision-
making, even when the most obvious sources are removed.  In other words, one can remove 
directly interested directors or shareholders from the deliberative process and still expect a 
bias in terms of transactional outcomes.  Interesting psychological research has shown that 
“gatekeepers,” even statutorily regulated independent auditors, are prone to motivated 
inference when there are strong client or customer preferences and some “wiggle room” for 
coming out the preferred way.51  For purposes of the standard of review, allowing too much 
discretion—giving independent directors full sway so long as they act in good faith, for 
example, or within some far-ranging zone of reasonableness—probably leaves too much 
room for bias.   
Here again, the arguments both for and against abstention of the business judgment 
rule are complicated, and courts may well choose to look the other way rather than to engage 
in deep inquiries into subjective motivation, even when they recognize the psychological risk.  
                                                 
46 Baker et al., Behavioral Corporate Finance, supra note 13, at 46. 
47 See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958 (Del. 1985); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & 
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986). 
48 See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983). 
49 See, e.g., Ronald Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later (and What We Can Do About It), 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 495 
(2001).  Many have commented on the tensions and uncertainties in the law. Id. William T. Allen et al., Function 
Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1293 (2001). 
50 This is occasionally remarked upon by the courts.  E.g., Paramount Comm. Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 
A.2d 34, 50 (Del. 1994) (noting the board’s obsessive focus on completing the original deal: “they remained 
prisoners of their own misconceptions”). 
51 E.g., Max Bazerman et al., Why Good Accountants Do Bad Audits, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov. 2002, at 96.  
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Thus the most important message derived from this research applies to those individuals 
trying to manage the deal process in the shareholders’ best interest.  Those individuals, 
including the lawyers, bankers, and accountants, should recognize the pressures driving 
members of the deal team and be demanding and critical, even when they genuinely believe 
in doing the deal. 
 The same can be said with respect to disclosure of conflicts of interest, which may 
occur in many different contexts, often because legally required.  In a well-known 
psychology article, Daylian Cain, George Loewenstein, and Don Moore offered striking 
experimental evidence that disclosure of conflicts actually makes opportunism by the 
discloser more likely, because disclosure creates greater moral freedom to so behave because 
the subject has been warned, and at the same time makes the subject more willing to trust, 
because the act of disclosing is disarming, at least when it appears to be voluntary.52  
Subsequent research questions the strength of these effects, at least where the subject can 
hold the discloser accountable later on.53  Nevertheless, the effects of disclosure remain of 
interest in the transactional setting, because of the pervasiveness of disclosure and the 
variability in the level of accountability.   
 Consider, for example, Minzer v. Keegan,54 a Second Circuit case wherein a controlling 
entity engineered a freeze out merger at a price unpopular with many shareholders.  The 
shareholders nonetheless voted to approve the transaction because the offered price was 
better than the prevailing distressed market price for their minority stock.  The conflicting 
interest was fully disclosed, but the controlling party neglected to reveal a potentially serious 
inquiry by a third party who was prepared to pay more.  The court held that there was no 
liability even if the omission was material because the shareholders had no power to compel 
the majority to consider the alternative bid.  Thus, the freeze out price was their only real 
choice.  In other words, there was no causal injury.  Regardless of whether the court’s 
decision was correct, one at least has to wonder whether the disclosure of the conflict let the 
controlling person feel freer to cast fiduciary obligations aside, or whether shareholders were 
lulled into thinking that the transaction was being handled responsibly, in part, because the 
adverse interest disclosure was so clear. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 Research in psychology and behavioral economics sheds interesting, sometimes 
disturbing, light on the processes by which M&A transactions occur.  Of course, the findings 
are not limited to M&A.  The same research has identified other corporate finance contexts 
in which similar effects are observed.  With respect to the recent financial crisis, for example, 
one can easily see how hubris and excessive optimism can lead down the slippery slopes to 
both excessive risk-taking and concealment of those risks from investors, such that the 
                                                 
52 Daylian Cain et al., The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 
(2005). 
53 See Brian Church & Xi Kuang, Conflicts of Interest, Disclosure, and (Costly) Sanctions: Experimental Evidence, 38 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 505 (2009); see also Christopher Koch & Carsten Schmidt, Disclosing Conflicts of Interest—Do Experience 
and Reputation Matter?, 35 ACCT. ORG. & SOC’Y 95 (Jan. 2010). 
54 See Minzer v. Keegan, 218 F.3d 144, 150 (2d Cir. 2000).   
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insiders themselves may, at least for a time, be blinded to reality.55  Categories such as bad 
faith and scienter may be very poor fits for these kinds of situations, too.   
 As I emphasized, there are limits on courts’ and regulators’ ability or willingness to 
confront the highly contingent, situational nature of officer or director inference and 
decision-making.  But we can at least hope that they will accept the main insight from the 
behavioral literature, that rationality in corporate judgment cannot be presumed, and often 
fails.  Beyond that, the greatest use for this research is mainly for participants in the 
transactional process itself, who very much need to better understand not only that human 
nature poses a risk to the deal, but how, why, and under what circumstances there is reason 
to worry.56 
                                                 
55 See Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the Greased Pig: A Gatekeeper’s Guide to the Psychology, Culture and Ethics of Risk-
taking in Financial Services, CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming, 2011) (manuscript at 2-3, available at 
http://sssrn.com/abstract=1639138); see also Malcolm Gladwell, Cocksure: Banks, Battles, and the Psychology of 
Overconfidence, NEW YORKER, July 27, 2009, at 24. 
56 An excellent resource is PAUL BREST & LINDA HAMILTON KRIEGER, PROBLEM SOLVING, DECISION MAKING, 
AND PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT: A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS AND POLICYMAKERS (2010). 
